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[‘People with gender identity disorder live with a conviction that their physical 
anatomy is incompatible with their true gender role. They have an overwhelming 
desire to live and function in the opposite biological sex’.1 The manifestation of the 
disorder in children and adolescents is dominated by secrecy, confusion and shame. 
The purpose of this article is to promote discussion amongst the legal fraternity of 
the difficult issues confronting the Family Court of Australia when asked to make 
decisions with life-altering ramifications for the young and vulnerable.] 
 
 
 Truth and Justice are all one, for Trust is but Justice in our knowledge, 
 and Justice is but Truth in our practice.2 
     
I INTRODUCTION 
 
Medical and scientific understanding of the aetiology of gender identity disorder 
has been greatly advanced in recent years. The prevailing opinion is that neither 
nature nor nurture alone is the answer to a person’s sense of self and it is clear that 
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both are involved in producing the complex child we call “boy” or “girl”.3 The 
physical distinction between “male” and “female” is not absolute. The modern view 
is that individuals are regarded as a continuum with female sex characteristics at 
one extreme and male at the other.4 The process of becoming a boy or girl (man or 
woman) is a multi-step process; each step a consequence of the one preceding it and 
itself a critical phase in further development.5 If a phase is missed there is no back-
tracking and there may be an impact on the complex mix of factors that ultimately 
determines the sexual identity of the child; the gonadal, genital, chromosomal, 
neurological, psychological, social and cultural considerations identified by Chis-
holm J in Re Kevin.6 
 
The many and complex issues of gender identity disorder in an adolescent were 
canvassed and analysed in a judgment brought down by Nicholson CJ of the Family 
Court of Australia on 13 April 2004. In the matter of Re Alex,7  an application was 
made to the court for authorisation of a sequence of treatments comprising first, 
reversible hormonal therapies until age 16, second, irreversible hormonal therapies 
until age 18 and, finally, surgery, to effect a change in phenotypic sex as an adult. 
The first step proposed was the administration of a form of contraceptive pill con-
taining oestrogen and progestogen to suppress Alex’s menses. His Honour agreed.  
   
II BACKGROUND TO THE MATTER OF RE ALEX 
 
Alex, the only child of his parents’ marriage, was born outside Australia.8 He pre-
sented as a female infant with no apparent ambiguity in external or internal sexual 
characteristics and with normal female (XX) chromosomes. Alex lived with his 
mother and father until age five or six. The relationship he had with his mother was 
a sad one by any standard. He felt rejected by his mother and referred to her as 
‘…affectionless and harsh’.9 His relationship with his father, however, was charac-
terised by closeness and affection. Describing this relationship, Alex said it was 
‘…like best friends; he told me if he was sad and I told him how I felt’.10 He shared 
a bed with his father and bathed and showered with him. No evidence was given, or 
suggestion made, of any sexual impropriety in this relationship. 
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When he was five or six years old, his father died. The traumatic impact on Alex 
can be gauged from an affidavit filed by a consulting medical practitioner stating:  
 
 [Alex] related the process of [his] father’s death with great distress; say-
ing that [he] still vividly remembers the events around his death. [He] 
thought something had “blown up in [the father’s] head” and [the father] 
died on the way to hospital. [Alex] could not see his body for some three 
days afterwards and still has vivid flashbacks to events around his death. 
[The father] frequently enters [Alex’s] nocturnal dreams. 
[Alex] said [his father] was gentle “like a girl”. He was “a good man, he’d 
speak to people like a man and my mum’s family loved him so much”. At 
times [Alex] felt that [his father] hadn’t died and that [his father] was just 
sleeping. At times [he] speaks to [his father] although he knows [his fa-
ther] is not able to respond. It feels like “[father’s] smiling in my mind.”11      
 
Alex arrived in 2000 after his mother married a man who sponsored them to Austra-
lia.12 He was distressed by his mother’s second marriage and evidence was given 
that he felt angry with his mother and rejected by his stepfather whom he believed 
had turned his mother against him.13 This feeling of rejection was borne out when, 
some nine months after the family’s arrival, Alex was made the subject of a care 
order by a Children’s Court under a child welfare law.14 The order appointed the 
relevant Government Department as his guardian and this department was the 
applicant in the matter. At this stage Alex was living with his paternal aunt, who is 
supportive of him. He continues to do so.  
 
The main circumstances leading to the order were (taken from the judgment in Re 
Alex): 
 
• The mother and step-father has [sic] taken six months before enrolling 
Alex in an English Language School. 
• Alex presented as very aggressive to students and had assaulted peers. 
• The mother had said that Alex had tried to kill his step-brother by running 
into him with his bicycle and had poked something into the younger 
child’s ear until it bled. 
• At home, Alex slept in his own bedroom while the mother and the younger 
two children slept in a locked separate bedroom to prevent Alex from en-
tering. 
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• The mother had said that there is no love between her and Alex and his 
step-father had said that there was no relationship with Alex and did not 
see Alex as important. 
• The mother has said that Alex threatened to kill his step-siblings and that 
she wanted Alex out of the home. 
• The mother had said that in their country of origin, she had asked the au-
thorities to take Alex away but they refused.15   
 
The reports submitted to the Children’s Court also detailed evidence of concerns 
that Alex was asserting his maleness:  
 
[Alex] presents as very masculine and wears boy’s clothes. The mother has 
said that [Alex] has told her that he wants to be a boy and the school state 
[sic] that [he] has used the boy’s toilets at school.16   
 
The conflict between Alex and his mother was made manifest in her refusal to see 
him or be any way involved in decisions regarding where and how Alex should live, 
his safety or well-being. In evidence before the Children’s Court, it was suggested 
by Dr “J” that this long-standing relationship breakdown had been exacerbated by 
Alex’s incomplete mourning of his father’s death. Dr “J” also believed that, in 
fearing that Alex was a follower of the devil and would kill family members, his 
mother was exhibiting a paranoia about him.17  
 
III THE ASSUMPTION OF JURISDICTION BY THE                             
FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA  
 
The issue of Alex’s medical treatment was referred to the Family Court of Australia 
as a matter pertaining to the welfare of the child and orders were sought under s 
67ZC of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (the Act).18 
 
As Mushin J pointed out in Re A,19 the majority of the High Court of Australia in 
Marion’s case  
 
…made it clear that the 1983 amendments to the Family Law Act vested in 
the Family Court “the substance of the parens patriae jurisdiction.20  
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2004 Adolescent Gender Identity Disorder  369     
 
Under its parens patriae power, the Family Court of Australia has jurisdiction to 
authorise certain medical procedures where a child is incapable of consenting to 
medical treatment.21 Whether the proposed treatment or intervention is outside the 
scope of a parent to consent to on behalf of his or her child, is dependant on the 
nature of the medical treatment.22 Court authorisation for medical treatment is 
required where there is a significant risk of making the wrong decision, either as to 
a child’s present or future capacity to consent, or consequences of a wrong decision 
are particularly grave.23 It is an established principle that a minor is capable of 
giving informed consent to medical treatment when he or she achieves a sufficient 
understanding and intelligence to enable him or her to fully understand what is 
proposed.24 Alex was 13 years of age and the proposed treatments were a type of 
‘special medical procedure’ such that His Honour held neither Alex as a minor, nor 
the applicant as guardian, could give consent. 
 
Whereas His Honour was mindful of the depth of maturity of Alex and the consis-
tency of his stated wishes, he found, given all the circumstances in this case:  
 
…the evidence does not establish that Alex has the capacity to decide for 
himself whether to consent to the proposed treatment. It is one thing for a 
child or young person to have a general understanding of what is proposed 
and its effect, but it is quite another to conclude that he/she has sufficient 
maturity to fully understand the grave nature and effects of the treatment.25  
 
IV NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE                                      
FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA 
 
In Re Alex, Nicholson CJ adopted a commonsense approach to the conduct of 
proceedings. After appointing a Child Representative, he adhered to convention 
only in so far as the evidence-in-chief was mostly received by way of affidavit. The 
sequence of hearings, however, was conducted in a “round table”26 inquisitorial 
format that, in His Honour’s words: 
 
…often took the form of an orderly discussion between witnesses and legal 
representatives (including, sometimes, instructing solicitors) and myself.27  
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His Honour believed this format:  
 
…enhanced the depth and richness of the evidence, and thereby better  
served the aim of an outcome which will be in Alex’s best interests.28  
 
It was noteworthy, but not without precedent29 that, at the request of Alex, and with 
the encouragement of all the parties, Nicholson CJ met privately with Alex in 
chambers and gave him every opportunity to express his own views as to his future 
treatment and care.30 
 
His Honour’s adoption of this approach was not without criticism, however; the 
tenor of some of which may be gauged from the following: 
 
…Alex is a profoundly betrayed girl, in a perfectly normal girl’s body, 
who seems to have been so traumatised by the grotesque behaviour of her 
parents and stepfather that she feels only a sex-change can now make her 
happy. And for a court to agree with this poor abandoned girl‘s fantasy af-
ter an odd court hearing that seems to have minimised the chance of any-
one objecting is deeply troubling…31  
 
I have read Chief Justice Alastair Nicholson’s judgment and it alone 
proves to me Alex was not born in the wrong body at all.32 
 
I think [the panel of medical experts] was set up by the Department. You 
can’t get six medical experts with such agreement unless somebody sets it 
up.33 
 
 [The doctors who supported the proposal] should be seen as products of 
their time and the ideological biases of male dominance… Feminists like 
myself envisage a time beyond gender when there is no correct way to be-
have according to body shape…34 
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The disrespect of at least one of these commentators for the court was palpable: 
 
Unlike Nicholson, I didn’t hear all the evidence… but Nicholson’s judg-
ment scares me…35 
 
Even the Prime Minister hinted at some sort of legal intervention. Indicating he 
would seek advice in the matter, he said: 
 
I guess I share the reaction of a lot of Australians that is this the sort of 
thing a court should be doing?36 
 
Contradicting these detractors, however, an editorial in The Age demonstrated a 
considerably greater understanding of the dilemma faced by the Chief Justice in 
reaching a decision that would allay the distress so apparent in Alex: 
  
Adolescent unhappiness, by definition, is not measured by an adult per-
spective on life and sometimes what an adolescent may think of as unbear-
able would not seem so to an adult. But, precisely for that reason, anyone 
who must deal with an adolescent’s misery needs to consider very care-
fully what the consequences of disregarding it may be.37 
 
V EVIDENCE AS TO ALEX’S GENDER IDENTITY 
 
Nicholson CJ considered evidence from medical specialists of wide-ranging exper-
tise, not only those who had direct dealings with Alex,38 but also others located 
overseas to whom the history, diagnosis and treatment recommendations were 
provided for further consideration.39 His Honour also heard evidence from others 
close to Alex.40 This led His Honour to make interim orders permitting Alex to 
commence the first stage of hormonal treatment, reversible oestrogen and progesto-
gen therapy, a course of treatment he found to be in Alex’s best interests.41 There 
was a sense of urgency behind this because Alex was shortly to start at a new high 
school in his male gender and had expressed his concerns that the presence of 
periods and an increasingly feminised body would greatly distress and disadvantage 
him.42  
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It was common ground that Alex had a long-standing, unwavering and present 
identification as a male.43  He behaved as a boy and demonstrated his maleness, 
inter alia, by refusing to use female toilets or line up with the girls at school.44 He 
wore boy’s clothes and engaged in rough play.45 There were real fears that Alex 
may be driven to self-harm in the event that he was unable to fully express his 
gender identity.  
 
Mr “H”, the Primary School Principal said: 
 
[Alex] was in my office and [he] was definitely quite distraught and want-
ing to kill [himself] because nobody was taking this whole thing seriously 
about the gender.46 
 
In like vein, Ms “R” reported Alex’s difficulty in managing his depression and 
aggression: 
 
We had to put him in a placement… because he was actually threatening to 
kill himself and saying he would rather be dead and didn’t want to live this 
way, that he wasn’t a girl and didn’t want to be a girl. I felt very seriously 
that he actually meant that.47 
 
Dr “N” stated: 
 
Alex would be intolerant of, and resistant to, behavioural treatment aimed 
at reversing his male gender identification and behaviour.48  
 
Prof “P” recounted: 
 
[Alex] has presented a consistent account of the development of [his] own 
gender identity to myself and to many other professionals involved in [his] 
care. [He] says [he] has always thought of [himself] as a boy even though 
[he] had apparently limited understanding of the human body when first 
seen in the current context… [he] said that [he] grew up in [his] first years 
of life believing that [he] was a boy.49 
 
All the expert deponents concurred that Alex exhibited classic symptoms of gender 
identity disorder.50 
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VI CONCLUSION 
 
His Honour’s findings in Re Alex were many and far-reaching. In simple terms, the 
Chief Justice decided that it was in the best interests of Alex that the court should 
confirm its interim order authorising the commencement of a course of Microgynon 
‘50’, an oral contraceptive pill containing both oestrogen and progestogen to be 
taken continuously in order to suppress menses. His Honour further ordered that the 
matter be adjourned until 6 months before Alex’s 16th birthday at which time further 
submissions would be considered in relation to the commencement of irreversible 
hormonal therapies comprising testosterone and LRHR analogue to suppress the 
release of gonadotrophins from the pituitary gland. Any decision to seek surgical 
affirmation is for Alex alone and must wait until his 18th birthday.51  
 
Nicholson CJ was mindful of the depth of Alex’s conviction of himself as a male. 
In Alex’s short life he had lost so much: his father; his country; his mother’s love; 
and, ultimately, his family and home. As if this were not sufficient impediment to 
his happiness, Alex suffered the extreme distress brought about by a physical body 
that contradicted his gender identity. There was nothing the Chief Justice could do 
to restore his family, but what His Honour tried to achieve, by every means possi-
ble, was to bring Alex peace with regard to the incongruence between his pheno-
type and male identity. His Honour had no power to look into the future, however, 
as retired Family Court Judge, Hon Travis Lindenmayer said:  
 
Family Court judges are legally obliged to hear cases such as Alex’s pre-
cisely because there is a grave risk that a wrong and irreversible decision 
might be made. As with a good parent faced with hard choices, only time 
will tell if this judge was right. If Alex had been refused treatment and 
committed suicide, there would still be questions and criticisms, just very 
different ones. 52 
 
And death is absolutely irreversible. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
51
  The age at which a person is an adult under both the Family Law Act 1975 and the UN Convention on 
the Rights of the Child. 
52
 ‘How a Judge Rescued Alex’, Herald Sun (Melbourne), 27 April 2004, 18. 
